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Dignity is a commonly invoked, but rarely defi ned, concept in clinical care. Hospital brochures and Patients’ Bills of Rights 
inform patients that they have a right to be treated 
with dignity (Johns Hopkins Medicine, 2013), 
professional codes increasingly direct clinicians to 
provide dignifi ed care (American Medical Associa-
tion, 2012–2013; International Council of Nurses, 
2012), and patients in a variety of clinical settings 
report that receiving dignity–preserving care is 
important to them (Chochinov, Hack, McClement, 
Kristjanson, & Harlos, 2002). At the same time, a 
growing number of studies have concluded that 
as many as one–half of all hospitalized patients 
experience “a loss of dignity” during interactions 
with the health care system (Gordon and Betty 
Moore Foundation, 2012), a risk that is heightened 
for patients in intensive care settings (Baillie, 2009; 
Turnock & Kelleher, 2001).
Despite dignity’s presence in the clinical lexicon, 
there is not widespread agreement—in either the 
academic literature or in everyday clinical conver-
sations—about what dignity means (Gallagher, 
2011). On some accounts, dignity is primarily, if not 
Respect and Dignity: 
A Conceptual Model for Patients in the Intensive Care Unit
Leslie Meltzer Henry1*, Cynda Rushton1, Mary Catherine Beach1, and Ruth Faden1
1) Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University
*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie Meltzer Henry, JD, MSc at University of Maryland Carey 
School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201–1786. Email: lhenry@law.umaryland.edu
RESEARCH ARTICLES
Acknowledgements. Funding for this project came from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Drs. Hanan 
Aboumatar, Joseph Carrese, Gail Geller, Nancy Kass, and Jeremy Sugarman provided helpful comments and 
input. The authors thank the Berman Institute faculty, who contributed to discussions about respect and dignity 
during faculty meetings.
Confl icts of Interest. The authors report no confl icts of interest.
Abstract. Although the concept of dignity is commonly invoked in clinical care, there is not widespread agree-
ment—in either the academic literature or in everyday clinical conversations—about what dignity means. 
Without a framework for understanding dignity, it is diffi cult to determine what threatens patients’ dignity and, 
conversely, how to honor commitments to protect and promote it. This article aims to change that by offering 
the fi rst conceptual model of dignity for patients in the intensive care unit. The conceptual model we present is 
based on the notion that there are three sources of patients’ dignity—their shared humanity, personal narratives, 
and autonomy—each of which independently warrants respect. The article describes each source of dignity 
and draws on examples to illustrate how clinician attitudes, actions, and behaviors can either contribute to, or 
detract from, expressions of respect for patient dignity.
Key Words. Autonomy, Dignity, Intensive Care Unit, Patient, Respect
6A Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics • Volume 5 • Number 1A • Winter 2015
exclusively, about respecting patients’ autonomy 
(Pinker, 2008; Macklin, 2003). On other accounts, 
respecting patients’ dignity involves attention to a 
constellation of factors, including patients’ medical 
fears and anxieties, bodily privacy, cultural and 
religious differences, and relationships with others 
(Chochinov, 2002). Without a common framework 
for understanding dignity, it is diffi cult to determine 
what threatens patients’ dignity and, conversely, how 
to honor commitments to protect and promote it.
As part of a larger project aimed at eliminating 
preventable harms to patients in intensive care 
units (ICUs), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foun-
dation included “loss of dignity” as a previously 
overlooked and “unrecognized harm” to patients 
(Adamy, 2012; Sugarman, 2015). Unlike traditional 
clinical harms (such as hospital–based infections 
or surgical complications), which can be measured 
and addressed using standardized criteria and 
treatment regimens, harms to patients’ dignity are 
more diffi cult to identify and rectify in part because 
we lack a conceptual lens through which to view 
and correct them.1 To fi ll that void, and ultimately 
improve the care that patients in ICUs receive, we 
embarked on a project to conceptualize respect and 
dignity as they relate to patients in that setting.
The conceptual model that we offer, which is 
based on our review of the philosophical and clini-
cal literature on respect and dignity, is focused on 
understanding the sources of, and ensuring respect 
for, the dignity of patients, regardless of age or level 
of consciousness. In this article, we focus on the 
model’s application to adult patients in the ICU. 
There are particular and important nuances of this 
framework when applied to infants and children, 
and to adults in other clinical settings, that we 
do not address herein. It is equally important to 
consider how to ensure respect for the dignity of 
clinicians and patients’ loved ones in the ICU, but 
we reserve those questions for a later date.
1. Some qualitative data about dignity–related harms have 
been gathered. See Chochinov, Hack, Hassard, et al. (2002) 
and Chochinov (2002).
In this article, we claim that respect is owed to 
ICU patients because they possess dignity. Respect 
is an attitude, behavior, or feeling toward an entity 
that conveys proper regard or consideration for that 
entity,2 in this case, patients in the ICU. Dignity—
derived from the Latin word dignus, meaning wor-
thy—is a multifaceted concept that both signifi es a 
patient’s moral worth and grounds an obligation 
to respect the patient.
We contend that patient dignity is grounded 
in three characteristics of patients, each of which 
independently warrants respect. The fi rst source of 
patient dignity, and the one that all patients possess 
equally and absolutely regardless of age or level of 
consciousness, is shared humanity. Shared humanity 
is an immutable feature of persons that cannot be 
taken away or diminished. It requires a baseline level 
of respect for patients as human beings, regardless 
of any specifi c characteristics they may or may not 
possess. Beyond shared humanity are two additional 
sources of dignity that are unique to each patient 
and that ICU patients may express and experience to 
varying degrees. These sources of dignity, which also 
warrant respect, are patients’ personal narratives and 
their actual or potential autonomy. Patients’ personal 
narratives include, among other things, their familial 
and societal roles, relationships with others, likes 
and dislikes, religious views, and lived experiences. 
Patients’ autonomy encompasses making choices 
that allow them to live a life based on their distinctive 
values, preferences, and plans. In the case of infants 
and children, we respect their emerging capacities for 
autonomous choice and relational potential.
Although the model distinguishes among the 
three dignity–generating features of patients—shared 
2. Respect has been understood in other ways as well, for 
example, as a principle (Frankena, 1986). Respect is entity 
generated, meaning that it is not driven by the interests or 
desires of the person respecting the entity, but rather by some 
feature of the entity itself. Accordingly, we may not like a 
particular entity, but we may still have a duty to respect it 
because the entity possesses moral signifi cance independent 
of us (Dillon, 2014).
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humanity, personal narrative, and autonomy—the 
model also acknowledges that these sources of dig-
nity, and the respect they demand, at times intersect 
(Figure 1). Patients’ personal narratives, for example, 
frequently infl uence the health care decisions they 
make as autonomous individuals. To respect both 
sources of patients’ dignity, clinicians can adopt a 
nonjudgmental and accepting attitude toward each 
patient, even when patients’ values and choices con-
fl ict with clinicians’ beliefs and recommendations. 
In the ensuing discussion, we describe each source 
of dignity and draw on examples to illustrate how 
clinician attitudes, actions, and behaviors can either 
contribute to, or detract from, expressions of respect 
for patient dignity.
Shared Humanity
All patients, and indeed all people, possess dig-
nity simply by virtue of being human. There is a 
theological basis for this view, in which humans 
derive their dignity from their creation in God’s 
image (Barilan, 2009; Shultziner, 2006; Torrance, 
1988), and there is a secular version, in which 
humans derive dignity from their shared human-
ity (Margalit, 2007). On both interpretations, all 
human beings possess dignity intrinsically and 
equally (Meyer, 1989). Whether old or young, 
wealthy or poor, Nobel laureate or trash collector, 
individuals are entitled to be treated with equal 
respect for their dignity befi tting their value as 
human beings.
Figure 1. Three Sources of Patient Dignity that Warrant Respect
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Shared humanity is the fi rst and central source of 
dignity in the conceptual model we propose because 
it applies to all patients, regardless of any specifi c 
qualities they may or may not have (Gewirth, 1992; 
Kolnai, 1995; Nordenfelt, 2004; Spielberg, 1970). A 
patient in a persistent vegetative state, for example, 
who may lack the biological, cognitive, and rela-
tional capacities that we commonly associate with 
persons, nevertheless possesses this form of dignity. 
By contrast, the two other sources of dignity in the 
model are contingent: Whether someone has a per-
sonal narrative upon which they can refl ect (or that 
is otherwise discernable), and whether someone 
can exercise their autonomy, are capacities that may 
wax and wane across their disease trajectory. Some 
patients may have both capacities; other patients 
may have neither. By focusing fi rst on the source of 
dignity that patients universally and uncondition-
ally possess, the model imposes a baseline level of 
respect for all patients.
There are a variety of ways in which care in an 
ICU can be respectful of this fundamental aspect 
of patients’ dignity. First, clinicians and health 
care institutions can take steps to acknowledge 
each patient as having equal moral worth. This 
requires treating all patients with the same base-
line level of respect, regardless of their diagnoses, 
lifestyle choices, actions, attitudes, socioeconomic 
status, age, gender, race, religion, or culture (Beach, 
Roter, Wang, Duggan, & Cooper, 2006). It means, 
for example, applying resources and treatments 
equally to patients who are homeless and those 
who are fi nancially privileged. It means speaking as 
respectfully to patients who are not adherent to their 
treatment as those who are. It means showing the 
same regard for patients who have substance abuse 
addictions as those who do not. When clinicians or 
institutions treat some patients as less worthy—not 
only of their care, but also of their attention and 
compassion (Blanchard & Lurie, 2004)—they dis-
respect the universal dignity that all patients share.
Second, clinicians should enter each patient 
interaction with the presumption that every patient 
deserves to be respected as a human being. Even 
when a patient’s medical status—for example, 
deep sedation or unconsciousness—suggests that 
the patient is likely unaware of how others are 
treating him or her, clinicians should err on the 
side of treating the patient with the same respect 
owed any other patient. This bright line rule not 
only removes any ambiguity about which patients 
are owed respect as human beings (all are), it also 
reinforces the notion that the dignity derived from 
patients’ shared humanity requires clinicians to 
treat all patients with the same baseline level of 
respect.
Respecting the dignity of patients as human 
beings begins with not objectifying them. When clini-
cians refer to patients by name, look them in the eye, 
introduce themselves, and describe the care they are 
providing, they treat patients as people rather than 
objects. By contrast, when patients are labeled by 
their diagnosis, referred to by their room number, or 
discussed in the third person—even when they are 
not aware of being objectifi ed in this way—they are 
not treated with the respect owed to human beings. 
Patients are similarly objectifi ed when clinicians fail 
to recognize them at all. This can occur when patients 
are subjected to an examination without permission 
or explanation; when procedures are performed 
on them in an indifferent, rote, or distracted way; 
or when one clinician speaks to another about the 
patient as if the patient were not there.
As human beings with shared dignity, patients 
also are owed respect for their bodily and physical 
privacy. Unlike objects, people have expectations 
of privacy, and they experience feelings of vul-
nerability, shame, and humiliation. Even when 
patients’ medical status precludes them from 
experiencing these emotions, their shared human-
ity requires attention to their bodily privacy. Dur-
ing the course of receiving care, ICU patients are 
stripped of their clothing and belongings, and they 
are dressed in hospital gowns in which they may 
feel physically exposed. Their intimate bodily care, 
including washing and toileting, may necessitate 
assistance from others, sometimes of the opposite 
sex. Patients’ medical treatment may require them 
to be uncovered and touched by strangers in ways 
that interfere with space they consider personal. 
Their door or curtain may be left open for others 
to peer in. Collectively, these intrusions can pose 
challenges to patients’ sense of dignity (Matiti & 
Trorey, 2004).
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Clinicians can navigate these privacy boundaries 
with sensitivity and respect for the patient’s moral 
worth as a human being. As a fi rst step, clinicians 
might think of the patient’s hospital room or bed 
space as the patient’s private space. Clinicians 
should introduce themselves upon entering the 
patient’s space and explain why they are there. 
These actions signal respect for the patient’s physi-
cal privacy, while also creating a setting in which 
more intimate examinations or procedures can 
take place. When clinicians must undress or touch 
a patient’s body for an examination or procedure, 
they should discuss what is about to take place 
with the patient in a manner consistent with the 
patient’s capacity for understanding and conveying 
a choice. In cases in which the patient has the capac-
ity to understand and respond, clinicians should 
ask permission before uncovering or manipulating 
the patient’s body. For example, a clinician might 
say, “I need to listen to your heart and lungs now. 
Is that okay? You will feel the stethoscope on your 
chest as I listen.” When the patient lacks capacity 
or awareness, clinicians should nevertheless respect 
the patient’s bodily privacy by informing the patient 
of their intent. The clinician might say, for example, 
“I am going to change the bandage over your IV. You 
will feel a pull on your skin as I remove the tape, 
and it will feel cool as I cleanse the area. You may 
feel pressure as I replace the bandage.” Clinicians 
can further communicate respect for the patient’s 
bodily privacy, and thus her or his dignity, by clos-
ing the door or drawing curtains around the bed 
(where available), and redraping the patient when 
any procedure is complete.
Personal Narrative
Unlike shared humanity, which patients possess 
universally and absolutely, the extent to which 
patients have and can refl ect upon a personal nar-
rative is contingent and may wax or wane during 
the course of a patient’s illness. Most patients have 
a unique biographical story, even if they do not cur-
rently have the capacity to share or refl ect upon it. 
Having a personal narrative is a characteristic fre-
quently associated with possessing human dignity. 
Some philosophers refer to this feature of humans 
as generating a “dignity of identity” (Nordenfelt, 
2004, p. 74), whereas others describe it as a dignity 
of biographical “uniqueness” (Rolston, 2008). This 
source of dignity demands respect for people who 
have created, invested in, and internalized a per-
sonal narrative—one in which their family role, 
societal role, likes and dislikes, religious prefer-
ences, worldview, and lived experiences, among 
other things—make them uniquely who they are. 
At its core, respecting this source of dignity is about 
respecting individuals’ perceptions of themselves 
and what matters to them.
When people are hospitalized, they frequently 
experience a shift in their personal narrative. 
Often that shift involves a transition from being 
a healthy, able–bodied person to a critically ill, 
dependent patient (Coventry, 2006; van Gennip, 
Pasman, Oosterveld–Vlug, Willems, & Onwuteaka–
Philipsen, 2013). A growing number of empirical 
studies have demonstrated that, in these situations, 
patients measure their dignity by the degree to 
which their personal identity remains intact during 
medical treatment and the extent to which they are 
able to adapt their personal narrative to alterations 
imposed by their disease or treatment (Coventry, 
2006; Matiti & Trorey, 2004; van Gennip et al., 2013). 
Relevant factors in patients’ assessments often 
include whether they can continue to function in 
their previous roles, whether they can control their 
behavior, and whether their bodies remain recogniz-
able to them. The inability to do any one of these 
things is commonly accompanied by feelings that 
one’s dignity has been diminished.
In the ICU, respecting a patient’s personal nar-
rative begins with clinicians’ openness to discover-
ing the uniqueness of each patient. How does the 
patient perceive herself and her identity? What 
roles and relationships (familial, professional, or 
community based) are meaningful to her? Does 
she defi ne herself by a commitment to any cultural, 
religious, or other values? Are there any aspects of 
the patient’s self–image that may be particularly 
challenged by a hospital environment? For example, 
what are the patient’s norms around modesty? 
Is appearance especially important to her? Is she 
typically formal in her interactions with strang-
ers? What are her fears and concerns about her 
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hospitalization and illness? If the patient is sedated 
or unconscious, who was she before she became ill?
Understanding how a patient perceives these 
dimensions of her identity is the fi rst step in pro-
viding care that is respectful of this aspect of her 
dignity. Establishing who a patient is and what it is 
about her life, as she has lived it so far, that matters 
to her is a critical next step—not only because that 
knowledge may inform a medical decision, but also 
because it can help clinicians to provide care that is 
respectful of the unique person they are treating. 
Personal narratives can help clinicians to view their 
patient not only as the person they now see, but also 
as an accumulation of the person that the patient was 
before her hospital admission. For example, includ-
ing questions about the patient’s personal narrative 
in routine assessment tools and constructing a space 
where pictures of people central to the patient’s life 
can be displayed are ways to “re–personalize” ICU 
care. Just as the personal narrative of a woman who 
loses her only child is always inclusive of her being 
a mother, a patient’s personal narrative before her 
hospitalization may be central to her, even if she 
cannot return to it after her illness.
Once clinicians have developed an understand-
ing of a patient as a particular person, they can 
provide care that acknowledges and supports that 
patient’s identity. In this context, respecting the 
patient’s dignity requires treating the patient as a 
particular person. When health care providers treat 
patients with the same diagnosis with equal regard, 
but fail to address each patient’s discrete needs, they 
may respect the dignity related to patients’ shared 
humanity, but disrespect the dignity connected to 
each patient’s personal narrative. This can result in 
treating a patient’s narrow health problem, while 
ignoring his general well–being.
Respectful care, therefore, requires making 
efforts to “meet patients where they are.” When 
clinicians address patients by name—referring to 
patients who express a preference for formality by 
their title and last name (e.g., “Mr. Smith”), and 
to patients who prefer a more casual approach 
by their fi rst name—they signal respect for the 
individual patient before them. Discussions about 
treatment options should be similarly sensitive to 
each patient’s desires, fears, and values, including 
any religious and cultural beliefs that may impact 
individual health care decisions. For example, 
patients may have religious beliefs about the sanc-
tity of human life that inform their decision making 
about certain medical options near the end of life. 
Clinicians may not always agree with or understand 
a patient’s values, but openness to them is a crucial 
part of respecting the patient’s personal narrative, 
and as we discuss, it is also a necessary step in 
respecting their autonomy.
Clinicians can also respect patients’ personal 
narratives by facilitating “role preservation.” 
(Chochinov, 2002; McClement, Chochinov, Hack, 
Kristjanson, & Harlos, 2004). This involves encour-
aging patients to engage in their personal, profes-
sional, and societal roles and relationships to the 
extent possible within the constraints imposed 
by their illness and the hospital setting. Even 
when a patient’s identity has been temporarily or 
permanently altered by their disease, accident, or 
treatments, clinicians can demonstrate respect for a 
patient’s current and previous narrative by inviting 
the patient’s loved ones to connect to the patient 
through the roles they have played in the patient’s 
life. For unconscious or sedated patients, clinicians 
can express respect for the patient’s personal, pro-
fessional, and societal roles by asking the patient’s 
loved ones to bring in pictures or other artifacts that 
they believe the patient would fi nd meaningful and 
familiar in the midst of unfamiliar surroundings. 
The benefi ts of these actions are twofold: clinicians 
can demonstrate that they appreciate who patients 
are, apart from their illnesses, and an opportunity 
is given to express ways in which patients’ “selves” 
remain intact despite their time in the ICU.
Finally, respecting patients’ personal narratives 
means helping them maintain their pride, or their 
perception of their own worth (Chochinov, 2002; 
Matiti & Trorey, 2004; McClement et al., 2004). Patients 
in the ICU frequently experience challenges to their 
self–image. A patient who associates his identity with 
being well–groomed and conservatively dressed, for 
example, may not take pride in (or even recognize) 
himself when his hair is not brushed and his hospital 
gown does not completely cover his body. Similarly, 
a patient who defi nes her identity in large part by 
her ability to remain composed in stressful situations 
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may not feel “like herself” when her illness makes 
her outwardly emotional or her medication affects 
her impulse control. Although these circumstances 
can also affect how others view the patient, what 
matters here is that they confound the patient’s 
personal narrative as constructed and evaluated 
by her. When clinicians inquire about how patients 
perceive themselves, and take steps to help patients 
to maintain that self–image, they safeguard a critical 
aspect of patients’ dignity.
Autonomy
As our discussion of shared humanity and per-
sonal narratives demonstrates, there are signifi -
cant steps that can and should be undertaken to 
respect patients’ dignity in the ICU, even before 
reaching the more frequently considered issue of 
autonomy. Nevertheless, the aspect of dignity that 
has received the most attention in the bioethical 
literature—both positive and negative—relates to 
individuals’ capacity for autonomy. Kant (2005) was 
the fi rst philosopher to provide a thorough account 
of this view of dignity, which he associated with the 
distinctly human ability to discern the moral law 
and live by it. For Kant, dignity included not only 
an obligation to respect people’s freely rendered 
decisions, but also the concomitant obligation not 
to interfere with them by treating people as objects 
of another’s free will. In the context of clinical eth-
ics, the principle of respect for autonomy and the 
related requirement of informed consent aim to 
address this aspect of human dignity.
Importantly, not all patients in the ICU have 
the same degree of cognitive capacity or even the 
same interest in making decisions about their care. 
Many ICU patients intermittently or permanently 
lack decision–making capacity because they are 
sedated, chemically paralyzed, or have suffered 
injuries, diseases, or complications that render them 
incapable of discussing, understanding, or partici-
pating in treatment decisions. Other patients may 
have the ability to make decisions about their care, 
but would prefer to defer decision making to their 
health care team or loved one instead. Still other 
patients may have the limited capacity to make 
simple decisions, but insuffi cient ability to make 
more complex choices. For example, an ICU patient 
may not have the capacity to make decisions with 
irreversible consequences, such as the discontinua-
tion of life–sustaining therapies, but she may have 
the capacity to indicate preferences about where 
intravenous lines are placed or when she wants 
to receive personal care and by whom. Respecting 
patients’ autonomy—much like respecting their 
personal narratives—therefore requires attention 
to the uniqueness of each patient.
In this context, an inquiry is necessary to learn the 
extent to which a particular patient has the capacity 
and desire to exercise autonomy. A variety of tools are 
available to clinicians to assess a patient’s decision–
making capacity (Appelbaum, 2007; Chow, Czarny, 
Hughes, & Carrese, 2010). These evaluations, which 
should be a routine part of ICU care, offer clinicians 
not only an opportunity to examine a patient’s ability 
to understand, reason, and communicate a choice, 
but can also provide insight into the values underly-
ing a patient’s preferences.
Conversations that build trust between clini-
cians, patients, and (where appropriate) moral sur-
rogates who serve as designated decision makers 
for patients, are a related and vital step to provid-
ing care that respects patients’ autonomy. In these 
discussions, clinicians should ask about patients’ 
personal narratives (e.g., their values and their life 
before their ICU admission) and their expectations 
for life after they leave the ICU. Clinicians should 
also inquire and document whether patients have 
advance directives and a designated health care 
agent to speak and make treatment decisions for 
them when they are unable to do so. Collectively, 
these conversations create a space to discuss treat-
ment options with honesty and candor,3 but also in 
a manner sensitive to patients’ preferences.
3. Respecting self–determination requires presenting 
patients and their moral surrogates with all medically viable 
choices. However, creating the illusion of choice when there 
is no real choice—for example, by offering cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation in the ICU when the clinician knows it is 
extremely unlikely to restore heartbeat or respiration—
undermines authentic patient choice.
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It is, of course, too simple to suggest that clinicians 
merely need to engage patients and their moral surro-
gates in conversations about their care to respect their 
autonomy. Respecting this aspect of patients’ dignity 
also involves accepting patients’ or their moral surro-
gates’ informed choices, even when those choices run 
counter to the clinicians’ judgment. In cases where the 
choices of patients or their surrogates counter the clini-
cian’s judgment, respecting the dignity and autonomy 
of that patient might mean having more discussion 
to ensure that these choices are truly informed and 
autonomous or, in the case of a moral surrogate, 
appropriately refl ective of the patient’s values and 
preferences. Although we acknowledge that there are 
instances where clinicians are justifi ed in overriding 
the choices of moral surrogates and even sometimes of 
patients, the moral default setting must be otherwise.
“Authentic respect” for patient autonomy means 
approaching the patient encounter with a commit-
ment not to a particular outcome, but instead to the 
“process of understanding and meaning” (Rushton, 
2007). It involves accepting patients for the unique 
selves that they are, not speaking condescendingly 
to them, and ultimately respecting their dignity by 
honoring their preferences. In so doing, clinicians’ 
respect for a patient’s autonomy frequently over-
laps with the respect owed to the patient’s shared 
humanity and their personal narrative.
Conclusion
Despite its generally positive connotation in the 
context of clinical care, appeals to dignity in con-
temporary health policy and bioethical debates 
have received mixed reviews. For some com-
mentators, dignity is a value of such “paramount 
importance” (Kass, 2008, p. 298) that it should be 
“a central moral and social aim . . . of everyday 
medical care” (Dresser, 2008, p. 505) and the lingua 
franca of a just and caring health system (Annas, 
2005). For others, dignity is a concept in such 
disarray that it is at best a placeholder for more 
precise notions like autonomy (Macklin, 2003), 
and at worst, “nothing more than a short–hand 
expression for people’s moral intuitions and feel-
ings” (Kuhse, 2000, p. 72).
The dispute over dignity’s usefulness and pur-
pose is, in large part, a consequence of not having 
a conceptual framework or a discrete context in 
which discussions about dignity’s multivalent 
nature can take place (Henry, 2011). The model we 
offer aims to change that in the ICU setting by offer-
ing an understanding of dignity that is meaningful 
for participants in that context. By highlighting the 
three sources of patient dignity—shared humanity, 
personal narrative, and autonomy—and the types 
of respect that each requires in the ICU, the model 
offers a framework for identifying and rectifying 
threats to patients’ dignity in that setting. Although 
the conceptual model’s most immediate contribution 
is to advance scholarship about patient dignity in the 
ICU, we believe the model can be effectively opera-
tionalized in clinical practice to improve patient care.
Focusing on respect and dignity, however, is only 
part of the story. Most clinicians are predisposed to 
respect patients’ dignity, but for a variety of reasons 
may fi nd it diffi cult to do so. In the ICU, clinicians, 
patients, and their loved ones meet under conditions 
of uncertainty, stress, and high–stakes outcomes. Lit-
erally, life and death often hang in the balance. In this 
environment, clinicians may be depleted, burned out, 
or experiencing moral distress, any one of which can 
diminish their capacity to treat others with respect 
(Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, 2013a, 2013b). That 
reality, coupled with the broader culture and eco-
nomics of health care delivery, impact the way that 
clinicians interact with patients. Incentives for pro-
fessional advancement and fi nancial remuneration, 
for example, may thwart dignity–respecting care in 
favor of episodic, technology–focused communica-
tion and decision–making. The model we propose 
can help to identify these types of threats to patient 
dignity in the ICU, but a careful analysis of how 
clinician characteristics, environmental factors, and 
other variables impede respect for patient dignity is 
well warranted.
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